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Two teenage boys jumped a security fence at a research reactor in the San Francisco Bay Area, but there was no threat to the facility that uses highly enriched uranium that could be used to make a nuclear bomb.
As CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the organization charged with overseeing the reliability and security of the North American grid, I am deeply concerned about the shifting risk landscape facing the power industry. Conventional risks include randomized events such as extreme weather and equipment failures, while the emerging risks that could result from the intentional actions of unknown adversaries are asymmetrical and much less known. We are often left to imagine scenarios that might occur from such attacks and prepare to avoid or mitigate the consequences.